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To commence the slalutory lime
for appculs as of right (CPJ.,R 55 13 In]),
you are advised to serve a copy of this
order, witl1 notice of entry, upon all parties.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ORANGE
-------~--------------~----~-~-~-----------~---------)(

In the Matter of
GARY PERFETTO,
DECISION AND ORDER
INDEX NO.: 5247/2015
Returnable: 10/16/15

Petitioner,

-against-

TINA STANFORD, as the Chairwoman of the
State Board of Parole,
Respondent.
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the
CiviJ Practice Law and Rules

-------------------------------------------------------------X
SCIORTINO, J.
The following papers numbered I to 29 were considered in connection with the applications
by petitioner for an order and judgment pursuant to Civil Practice Law & Rules Article 78:
PAPERS

NUMBERED

Form Affidavit for Poor Person Status
Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause
Affirmation in Response to Poor Person Application
Order to Show CauseNerified Petition/Exhibits A-I
Answer and Return/Exhibits 1-11
Verified Reply/Exhibits A-B

1
2
3
4 - 14
15 - 26
27 - 29

,..

Petitioner Gary Perfetto (Petitioner) seeks an order and judgment pursuant to Civil Practice
Law & Rules Article 78 granting the following relief: (A) annulment ofthe Parole Board's February
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25, 2015 Decision denying him parole; and (B) a de novo parole hearing. 1
Background and Procedural History
Petitioner is serving an indeterminate sentence of 20 years to life, after conviction for the
1980 crimes of second degree murder and first degree robbery. He was first convicted in 1982, but
his conviction was reversed and remanded for new trial; and he wa.S convicted again of the same
charges in 1985. He has been in prison for approximately thirty years.
He first appeared before the Parole Board in 2004, and appeared again in 2006, 2008, 2009
and 2011. Each time parole was denied. Petitioner's November 2011 denial decision found:
After a review of the record and interview, the panel has determined that if
released at this time, your release would be incompatible with the welfare of society
and would so deprecated the serious nature of the crime·as to undermine respect for
the law. This decision is based on the following factors: your instant offense is
murder 2 and robbery 1. Your crime involved you causing the death of a victim by
striking him in the head and body with a blunt instrument during the commission of
a robbery. The victim was struck with a dozen blows to the head and then dragged
and dumped into a loading bay. The victim left behind a wife and children who will
forever be affected by this horrible crime. The Board n~tes your letters of support,
program accomplishments and vocational skills. All factors considered, however,
your release at this time is not appropriate.

An Article 78 petition was filed after the November 2011 denial, but denied by the Supreme
Court (Bartlett, A.J.).

However, the denial was reversed and vacated by the Appellate Division,

which remanded the matter for a de novo hearing. That hearing was held in February 2014, and is
not the subject of the within matter.
On or about February 25, 2015, petitioner was given the due course (bi-annual reappearance)

1

In his Verified Reply, petitioner also indicates his intention to seek sanctions against
Respondent.
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healing he would have had in November 2013, but which was adjourned pending his appeals.
During the course of that hearing, petitioner acknowledged that he no longer maintained his
innocence as to the verdicts, and that, when he testified at his first trial that he did not commit the
crime, he had lied. The panel spent significant time questioning petitioner about the circumstances
of his crime, during which he acknowledged having "targeted" his victim as "easy."

He also

testified that he had never injured or killed any other person. The panel took note of petitioner's
COMPAS assessment, which they characterized as a "tool, a resource, in an advisory way" to
measure petitioner's rehabilitation for re-entry into the community. The COMPAS scores placed
petitioner at low risk across the board for violence, arrest or absconding.
The Board noted p·etitioner' s acceptance into a housing program where, ifreleased, petitioner
could use his skills in air-conditioning, refrigeration, plumbing and heating. 'fb.ey further questioned
petitioner about his current outside clearance, which allows him to do plumbing and heating
throughout the facility, and his work with community service agencies in the community.

The

petitioner also instituted a "puppy program" at Otisville. Petitioner was questioned about his "nice
letters of support" from family members. At the conclusion ofthe hearing, he expressed his remorse
and took full responsibility for his actions.

The Panel's determination was a further denial with a

24-month hold to November 2015. The February 25.111 Decision found:
Following careful review and deliberation of your record and interview, this
panel concludes that discretionary release is not presently warranted due to concern
for the public safety and welfare. The following factors were properly weighed and
considered: your instant offenses in Queens in July 1980 involved murder 2°<1 and
robbery !51• Your criminal history indicates the instant offenses to be your only
offenses of record. Your institutional programming indicates progress and
achievement which is noted to your credit. Your disciplinary record appears clean
and is likewise noted. Required factors in the file have been considered. Required
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statutory factors have been considered, including your risk to the community,
rehabilitation efforts, and your needs for successful community re-entry. Your
discretionary release, at this time, would thus not be compatible with the welfare of
society at large, and would tend to deprecate the seriousness of the instant offonses
and undermine respect for the law.

Petitioner filed an Administrative Appeal of the Board's February 25, 2015 decision. No
administrative decision was rendere_d on his appeal for more than four months2• This entitled
petitioner to seek judicial relief pursuant to 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c).
Petition and Answer
The Verified Petition originally filed together with his Order to Show Cause on or about July
13, 20 l 5 asserts that petitioner's release was denied solely on the basis of the seriousness of his

offense, and the two conclusions reached by the Board are set forth in impermissibly conclusory
terms, unsupported by the facts.

Petitioner asserts that the determination was arbitrary and

capricious.
Essentially, petitioner argues that the February 25, 2015 Decision employs the same language
and conclusions which were vacated by the Appellate Division in the appeal of his 20 l 1 hearing.
]"4e determination lacks explanation or analysis of how the Board determined that petitioner's
release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would deprecate the seriousness of
his crime s·o as to undermine respect for the law.

2

An undated Statement of Appeals Unit Findings and Recommendations, recommending
the determination be affirmed, is appended to the Answer and Return as Exhibit 7.
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Petitioner further alleges that the Board's decision fails to meet the standards of Executive
Law §259-i(2)(A) and 9 NYCRR §8002.3(d), which require that the reasons for the denial of parole
be stated in detail. He·asserts that the decision was wholly conclusory and fails to detail its reasoning
as required by the Executive Law. Pointing to authority which requires the Board's conclusions to
be set forth in sufficient detail to enable appropriate judicial review, petitioner further argues that the
Board's conclusions are contrary to law, as they lack a sound basis in reason or with regard to the
facts. Specifically,

they ignore the COMPAS Assessment; the fact that the sentencing Court

determined that a 20-year to life sentence was appropriate; petitioner's completion ofmany required
and optional programs; his record of having remained free on bail without failing to attend at court
as required; and his satisfactory outside work record and accomplishments.
Because the Board's determination mirrors the language deemed unacceptable by the
Appellate Division in its 2014 Decision, petitioner asserts he is entitled to a de novo hearing.

In its Answer, respondent first argues that the failure of the Appeals Unit to timely issue a
Findings Statement does not render the underlying decision defective or invalidate the Board's
determination. The Court notes that this was not the position asserted by petitioner. However,
respondent goes on to argue that petitioner's attempt to raise in the Article 78 proceeding issues
which were not preserved in the administrative appeal is improper. On the administrative appeal,
petitioner asserted (1) the wrong hearing date was referenced in the determination; (2) the Board
failed to properly weigh and consider the required statutory factors and made its determination solely
on the basis of his underlying crimes; and (3) the Board's decision was made without sound basis
in reason or law. Thus, respondent asserts, this Court should not consider petitioner's arguments
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concerning the conclusory nature ofthe Board's conclusions, or its failure to consider the COMP AS
report, the determination of the sentencing court, petitioner's work record or his conduct while on
bail. ·However, with respect to the argument about sentenci.ng, respondent replies that the failure
to impose the maximum :?entence may not be interpreted as a favorable parole recommendation.
In all other respects, respondent argues that petitioner's claims are without merit. The Board
is entitled to exercise its independent judgment in weighing any statutory factor in making its
determination. In so doing, the Board may place greater weight on an inmate's criminal conduct
than upon his institutional adjustment and release plans; and a denial based on the determination that
the inmate's achievements are outweighed by the severity of his crimes is neither arbitrary nor
capricious, but is within the Board's discretion.

Parole is not a reward for good conduct or

achievements while incarcerated.
Respondent further asserts that the Board is not required to articulate the weight accorded to
each factor.

In the instant matter, respondent asserts that the record reveals that the Board

considered all the required factors and supported its determination that the extremely serious nature
of the offense was incompatible with the welfare of society. If the Board demonstrates that it has
weighed the statutory factors involved in release determinations, its decision may not be disturbed.
The Court may not consider petitioner's argument that "nothing of a negative nature has
changed in the petitioner's record since the Appellate Division('s determination]." The Board is
mandated, on each determination, to consider and review all of the criteria in Executive Law §259i(2)(c).
The 2015 determination is distinguishable from the 2011 determination based on the language
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employed. In the 2011 decision, there was "vehement" language used to detail the circumstances
of pe'titioner's crimes and a complete lack of detail about the other factors. In contrast, the 20 15
determination is "considerably more measured ... clearly givi~g equal emphasis to all factors listed."
Appearing to acknowledge that the

~oard's

determination "could have been stated more artfully,"

respondent reiterates that semantic differences between the determination and the statute is
permissible.

While the 2011 decision merely stated, without giving a reason, that petitioner's

release would be inappropriate, the 2015 decision went on to state that release was not warranted
because of "concem for the public safety and welfare." Thus, respondent asserts, the conclusion was
properly supported by rationale.
Petitioner's Reply points out that his administrative appeal did, in fact, raise and preserve
the argument that the Board's decision was conclusory. Moreover, the argument that the COMP AS,
work history, sentencing, and conduct while on bail arguments were unpreserved is also
unpersuasive, since these are, in fact, among the factors the Board is required to consider in making
its determination. The remainder of his Reply reiterates his previously articulated positions that the
determination was not based in fact or compliant with the law, and that the Answer and Return were
calculated to mislead and deceive, thus entitling the Court to levy sanctions.
Discussion
Standards for Review:

It has become fundamental that release on parole is a discretionary function of the Parole
Board. Provided that the determination ofthe Board follows statutory standards for such decisions,
it will not be disturbed by a court, absent a showing that the decision is "irrational bordering on
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impropriety" and, thus, arbitrary and capricious. Matter ofSilmon v. Travis, 95 NY 2d 470 (2000);

Matier ofKing v. NYS Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 (1st Dep't 1993), aff'd, 83 NY 2d 788 (1994);

Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51AD3d105 (!51 Dep't2008)
Executive Law §259-i(c)(A) provides that discretionary release on parole shall not be granted
merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined, but rather
after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such imnate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine respect for the law.

Matter ofKing, 190 AD2d at 430
The Parole Board is required to consider a number of factors in determining whether an
inmate should be released. ·Executive Law §259-i requires the court to consider factors including,
but not limited to, the institutional record (including program goals and accomplishments, vocational
education, academic achievements, etc); release plans, including community resources, employment,
education and training and available support services; any deportation order issued; the seriousness
of the offense, with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations ofthe sentencing court, the attorney and the pre-sentence probation report, and the
prior criminal record. Matter of Malone v. Evans, 83 AD3d 719 (2"d Dep't 2011 ); Siao-Pao v.

Dennison, 51 AD2d atl 06 For that reason, the Court rejects respondent's arguments that petitioner
did not preserve the issues regarding the Board's failure to consider relevant factors in his
administrative appeal.
The Parole Board's decision need not specifically refer to each and every factor nor must it
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give each factor e.qual weight. Matter ofKing, 190 AD2d at 431 The weight to be accorded to each
statutory factor lies solely within the discretion of the Board. Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 5 l AD3d at 108
However, it is incumbent on the Board to actually consider each applicable statutory factor and,
"where the record convincingly demonstrates that the board did in fact fail to consider the proper
standards, the courts must intervene." Matter of King, l 90 AD2d at 431

Executive Law

§259-c(4) requires the Board to incorporate .r isk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation
of persons appearing before the Board and the likelihood of success of such persons upon release.
1be 2011 Amendments to the Executive Law mandated the Parole Board to adopt procedures to
assist members in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision. Matter of

Thwaites v. NYS Board of Parole, 34 Misc. 3d 694 (2011)
Where the Board's determination includes consideration of all relevant statutory factors,
including the criminal history, the instant offense, the (lack ofj disciplinary infractions since the last
appearance, program and educational accomplishments and post-release plans, further judicial review
is precluded. Matter ofBorcsok v. NYS Division ofParole, 34 AD3d 961 (3n1 Dep't 2006)
Conversely, however, when the Board denies parole, it is required to inform the inmate in
writing of the factors and reasons for the denial, and "(s]uch reasons shall be given in detail and not
in conclusoryterms." Executive Law §259-i[2](a]; Mqtter ofMitchell v. NYS Division ofParole, 58
AD3d 742 (2"d Dep't 2009)

A detailed written explanation is necessary to enable intelligent

judicial review of the Board's decision. Matter of West v. NYS Board of Parole, 41 Misc. 3d
12 I 4(A) (2013) The absence of such a detailed decision inappropriately forecloses the possibility
of intelligent review. Mayfieldv. Evans, 93 AD3d 98, 100 (I51 Dep't2010)
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The decision to deny

parole cannot be based solely on the nature of the underlying offense. Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc.
3d 1232(A) (2010), citing Wallman v. Travis, 18 AD 3d 304, 307-08 (1 51 Dep't 2005)
A Parole Board's denial of parole which focused almost exclusively on the inmate's crime,
while failing to take into account and fairly consider any of the other relevant statutory factors which
categorically supported inmate 's release, was arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, the Board's failure
to explain, other than the facts of the crime, why the inmate's release was incompatible with public
safety and welfare, could not be supported.

Matter of Morris v. NYS Dep 't of Corrections and

Community Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226 (2013)
In the instant matter, the Court cannot find, as a matter of Jaw, that the Board's hearing
focused exclusively on petitioner's crime. In the hearing, the Board raised the issue petitioner's
community service, his lack of disciplinary matters, his outside work clearance, and his
achievements. Nor can the Court find that the Board ignored the COMPAS assessment in the
interview, noting, as it did, the positive results it considered.
However, the decision of the Board is another matter. Although the serious nature of the
crime remains "acutely relevant" in determining whether petitioner should be released, the Board
must still take into account and fairly consider the ot4er relevant statutory factors. Matter of West,,
41 Misc. 3d at 1214(A)

Petitioner's 2011 parole denial, vacated by the Appellate Division, and his 2015 denial
contain nearly identic.aljustification, i.e., petitioner's release would be incompatible with the welfare
of society and would deprecate the seriousness of the instant offenses and undermine respect for the
Jaw. Respondent points to the addition of the "concern for the public safety and welfare" in the
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language of the 2015 determination. Such language, however, is no more explanato1y or detailed
than the "boilerplate" justification echoed in nearly every parole denial decision.
It is particularly ironic that the "boilerplate" language follows a recitation of petitioner's
positive factors, including his Jack of other criminal history, his progress and achievements, his clean

.disciplinary record, etc., and then goes on to conclude that his discretionary release is thus
incompatible with the welfare of society at large. (Emphasis added)

Little could be more

contradictory and less informative.
In Matter of Thwaites, the Board's decision stated:
After a careful review of your record, a personal interview, and
deliberation, parole is denied. Your institutional accomplishments and
release plans arc noted, as is your improved disciplinary record. This
panel remains concerned, however, about your history of unlawful
conduct, the gracity (sic) ofyour instant offense and the disregard displayed
for the norms of our society, when considered with the required relevant
factors leads to the conclusion that your discretionary release is
inappropriate at this time and incompatible with the welfare of the
community and would so deprecate the seriousness of your crime as to
undermine respect for the law. (Emphasis added) (34 Misc. 3d at 696)
The Court in Thwaites found that this language, although referencing "positive" factors,
addressed, almost exclusively, the nature of petitioner's crime. (34 Misc. 3d at 700) While the
petitioner's accomplishments and release plans were noted, "the Board focused on the circumstances
of the crime committed twenty-five years ago." Id.
Reasoning that employs past-centered rhetoric and not future-focused risk assessment
analysis is inconsistent with the rational determination of the inquiry at hand, to wit, whether the
inmate can li've and remain al liberty without violating the law and whether his release was
incompatible with the welfare of society and did not deprecate the seriousness of his crime so as to
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undermine respect for the law. Id., citing Executive Law §259-i[2][c]
The Court in Matter of Thwaites found the Board's decision to be arbitrary and capricious,
irrational and improper based on the Board's failure to articulate any rational, non-conclusory basis,
other than its reliance on the seriousness of the crime, as to why the Board believed his release was
incompatible with the welfare of society and would deprecate the seriousness of his crime so as to
undermine respect for the law. Id. at 701
Similarly, in Matter of Morris, the Court found that a "passing mention" of petitioner's
accomplishments and document submissions, and conclusory statements that statutory factors were
considered were "woefully inadequate" to demonstrate that the Board weighed or fairly considered
the required statutory factors. 40 Misc. 3d at 234; Matter of West, 1214(A)
Although the Board need not specify each statutory factor in its decision, it must do "more
than merely mouth" those criteria, particularly where, as here, factors recited in the interview, other
than the crime itself, militated heavily in favor of release. Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc. 3d
1009(A) (2005) The Parole Board's determination must be sufficiently detailed to apprise petitioner
ofthe reasons for the denial.of his parole. Matter o,fStokes v. Stanford, 20 14 NY Slip Op. 50899(U)
(June 9, 2014), citing, Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 AD2d 742 (3rc1 Dep't 2002)
In this matter, the Board's decision appears to have accorded no weight to any factor apart
from the seriousness of petitioner's offense. See, Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc. 3d l 232(A} For
respondent to have simply restated the usual and predictable language contained in so many parole
release decisions ~ith no specificity or other explanation to justify parole denial is unacceptable.

Bruetsch v. NYS Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 43 Misc. 3d 1223(A)
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(5/l 1/2014) To simply defor to its conclusion leaves the reviewint 1·omt to guess at the basis for

the Board's denial. Vaello v. Parole Board Div. ofthe State ofNew York, 48 AD3d 1018, 109 (3m
Dep't 2008); Perfetto v. Evans, 112 AD3d 640 (21\11 Dep't 2013)
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes that petitioner has adequately established .
his contention that the Parole Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious, irrational and
improper. Having so determined, the Court need not reach any of the other arguments advanced by
petitioner. The confidential records submitted to the Court for in camera review are hereby sealed.
The February 25, 2015 decision of the Board of Parole is hereby vacated, and this matter is
remanded to the Board of Parole. Within 30 days of the date of the service of a copy of this Order,
with notice of entry, petitioner shall be entitled to a new parole hearing consistent with this decision
and the mandates of Executive Law §§259-c and 259-i. The new hearing shall be held before a
different panel of the Parole Board.
Petitioner's application to proceed as a poor person is granted, without opposition. Petitioner
shall pay a reduced filing fee of $15 f~r the costs of this application.
This decision shall constitute the order of the Court.
Dated: December 3, 2015
Goshen, New York
E N.J:·E R:

HON. SANDRA B. SCIORTINO, J.S.C.
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